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Monetary policy framework and financial procyclicality: 
international evidence 
Kyungsoo Kim, Byoung-Ki Kim and Hail Park
1 
Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of financial procyclicality and 
its role in increasing systemic risk. The Financial Stability Forum (2009, p 8) defined financial 
procyclicality as “the dynamic interactions (positive feedback mechanisms) between the 
financial and the real sectors of the economy”. Financial procyclicality, according to this 
definition, does not refer only to the fluctuations of financial variables around a trend. Rather, 
as noted by Landau (2009), it encompasses all of the following three components: 
fluctuations around the trend, changes in the trend itself, and possible cumulative deviations 
from the equilibrium value. To better understand financial procyclicality, therefore, we need to 
investigate the positive feedback mechanism destabilising the financial system.  
There is a growing literature on this subject and, as we understand, two suspects for causing 
the global financial crisis have come to the fore: central banks’ loose monetary policy and 
financial intermediaries’ behaviour. These two suspects are likely to be interdependent,
2 
which is in fact the exact topic that Adrian and Shin (2008) dealt with. Bean et al (2010) and 
Dokko et al (2009) also acknowledged this possibility. Indeed, monetary policy is transmitted 
to the real economy due to the existence of links between monetary policy and financial 
intermediaries’ behaviour. Furthermore, the interdependence between the two suspects in 
the current interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework has become unimaginably 
tighter.
3  Financial intermediaries can always tap the central bank under the interest rate-
oriented monetary policy framework, because the central bank’s high-powered money is 
injected into the financial system on an on-demand basis to keep short-term market rates 
closely aligned with the policy rate. Interbank transactions involving maturity transformation 
pave a silky way for this overnight funding to be extended into long-term loans to the ultimate 
borrowers. This process can cause excessive leverage by financial intermediaries, and can 
thus increase financial procyclicality. 
This paper seeks international evidence, by examining country-level panel data from 
14  countries with an inflation targeting framework and a floating exchange rate, that 
interbank transactions under an interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework can foster 
or accelerate financial procyclicality. 
                                                  
1  Kyungsoo Kim is Professor in the Economics Department of Sungkyunkwan University. He was Deputy 
Governor and Head of the Institute for Monetary and Economic Research of the Bank of Korea at the time of 
the conference. Byoung-Ki Kim and Hail Park are economists at the Economic Research Institute of the Bank 
of Korea. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those 
of the Bank of Korea. 
2  There is a huge literature on the monetary policy transmission channels that explicitly incorporates financial 
intermediaries’ behaviour. See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Borio and Zhu (2008). 
3  This does not necessarily imply that the central bank can more easily control financial intermediaries’ 
behaviour under the current monetary policy framework. Kim et al (2010) report that the two suspects’ 
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Interbank transactions, monetary policy framework and monetary policy
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This paper seeks international evidence, by examining country-level panel data from 
14  countries with an inflation targeting framework and a floating exchange rate, that 
interbank transactions under an interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework can foster 
or accelerate financial procyclicality (FP hereafter). 
Consider an upward-sloping yield curve, as shown in Figure 1. Bank 1 takes a deposit at D 
and makes a loan at L. It can then enjoy profits from the vertical difference between points L 
and D multiplied by the volume of the loan (or deposit), at the risk of maturity mismatch by 
the horizontal difference between points L and D multiplied by the volume of the loan. In this 
way maturity is transformed, and the maturity transformation (MT hereafter) is the essence of 
the banking activity.  
Figure 1 
Interbank transactions involving MT 
 
Suppose that Bank 2 comes in and issues an interbank liability to Bank 1. Instead of making 
a loan, Bank 1 lends to Bank 2 at A and Bank 2 in turn supplies the loan at L. Through this 
interbank liability, MT is exploited: Bank 1 shares the profit with Bank 2 with the benefit of 
less exposure to the risk of maturity mismatch. In fact, one can imagine that other banks also 
issue interbank liabilities and share profits through exploiting MT.  
Through the creation of interbank liabilities, however, systemic risk emerges. If for some 
reason Bank 2 becomes insolvent, then it may ignite a chain effect on Bank 1. In fact, when 
MT is exploited by many banks, the entire banking system may be exposed to potential 
systemic risk. Therefore, even though MT can reduce the risk of maturity mismatch at the 
individual firm level, the aggregate risk or systemic risk will rise.  
Interbank liabilities, however, do not automatically increase bank loans to the ultimate 
borrowers. As can be seen in Figure 1, MT, no matter how massive it is, only splits profit and 
risk between the banks engaged in such activities. But experience says interbank liabilities 
do in fact increase lending to the ultimate borrowers, the liquidity for which must come from 
somewhere else.
5 
                                                  
4  This part draws heavily on Kim et al (2010). Be advised, however, that Kim et al adopted a more formal 
approach. 
5  Shin (2009) noted that lending to the ultimate borrowers must be funded either from the equity of financial 
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This paper explores the possibility that an interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework 
fosters or accelerates FP. Under the current interest rate-oriented monetary policy 
framework, financial intermediaries can always tap the central bank provided they are willing 
to pay the policy rate. This is because the central bank’s high-powered money is injected on 
an on-demand basis into the financial system to keep the short-term market interest rates 
closely aligned with the policy rate. Loose monetary policy in this environment can induce 
massive interbank transactions involving MT financed by the additional supply of high-
powered money, which translates into a huge increase in loans to the ultimate borrowers, 
and in turn raises financial stability issues.
6 
Data and empirical analysis 
Our country-level data set covers 14 countries for the years 2002–09: the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. These countries are selected from among those 
adopting inflation targeting and floating exchange rate arrangements. Core assets are 
defined as the loans of the banks; thus, we use claims on the private sector in deposit money 
banks. Non-core liabilities
7 consist of bonds, liabilities to other banking institutions, foreign 
liabilities etc. The monthly series of core assets, non-core liabilities, monetary base, and 
broad money (M2 hereafter) are taken from the IFS (International Financial Statistics) data 
set. The series of the short-term and long-term interest rates are obtained from the IFS and 
Bloomberg. The growth rates of core assets, non-core liabilities, monetary base and M2 are 
employed in the empirical analysis. All growth rates are year-on-year rates, calculated as the 
differences in logarithms of the variables at times t and t-12; accordingly, the sample period 
for the estimation is between 2003 and 2009. 
We investigate the effects of non-core liability growth on core asset growth, monetary base 
growth and M2 growth, using the dynamic panel method. In order to examine these 




where   is the core asset growth rate of individual country i in the year t,   the non-
core liability growth rate,   the monetary base growth rate and   the M2 growth 
rate,   denotes the control variables, and   is an individual fixed effect.  
The short-term interest rate and the term spread between long-term and short-term interest 
rates are regarded as the control variables in Equation (1), while only the short-term interest 
rate is employed as a control variable in Equations (2) and (3). We use dynamic panel 
                                                  
6  Adrian and Shin (2008) pointed out that loose monetary policy might encourage risk appetite so that financial 
intermediaries would want to borrow short and bear illiquid balance sheets. Giavazzi and Giovannini (2010) 
also claimed that inappropriate monetary policy in the form of a low policy rate as a result of overlooking the 
risk of a financial crisis could induce excessive MT and increase the probability of such a crisis. This, they 
emphasised, could push the economy into a low-interest-rate trap, since the crisis would require low interest 
rates to keep the financial intermediaries alive. 
7  We use non-core liabilities as a close proxy for interbank liabilities, and core assets for loans to the ultimate 
borrowers. Shin and Shin (2010) distinguished between core and non-core liabilities of the banking sector. 
Core liabilities are held by the ultimate domestic creditors, such as the domestic household sector, while non-
core liabilities are held by other financial intermediaries or foreign creditors. 54  BIS Papers No 60
 
 
analysis because the dependent variables are substantially affected by their own lagged 
values. More precisely, we use the difference GMM method employing the lagged dependent 
variables as instrumental variables, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Effect of non-core liabilities on core assets  
We report the estimation results in Table 1. The coefficients of the non-core liability growth 
rate are very similar across different model specifications, in the range of 0.020 to 0.021, with 
significance at the 1% levels. The values in parentheses are the robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Including other control variables such as the short-term 
interest rate and the term spread does not seem to affect the role of non-core liability growth. 
We find positive coefficients on the term spread between long-term and short-term interest 
rates, implying that a higher term spread has a positive effect on core asset growth. The 
effects of short-term interest rates on core asset growth are negative. However, the effects of 
the control variables are statistically insignificant. Our findings suggest that an increase in 
core asset growth will be induced by a rise in non-core liability growth. 
 
Table 1 
Regression of core asset growth on non-core liability growth 
(Sample period: 2003–09) 
Dependent variable:  
Core asset growth  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
























Number  of  countries  14 14 14 14 
Number  of  observations  1129 1129 1129 1129 
AR(2)  test  (p-value)  0.967 0.969 0.975 0.972 
Hansen  test  (p-value)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: The values in parentheses are robust standard errors.    *, **, and *** indicate statistical significances at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Effects of non-core liabilities on the monetary base and M2 
From Table 2, we find that non-core liability growth has a significantly positive effect on 
monetary base and M2 growth. They are in a range between 0.031 and 0.034 for monetary 
base growth and between 0.042 to 0.044 for M2 growth, suggesting that the increase in 
non-core liability growth does lead to increases in monetary base as well as M2 growth. This 
means that, under an interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework, the central bank 
increases the money supply when private credit via non-core liabilities increases rapidly. The 
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coefficients in comparison with the models incorporating dependent lagged variables and 
non-core liability growth as explanatory variables. Overall, the results show that an increase 
in non-core liabilities induces increases in both the core asset (private credit) and monetary 
variables (monetary base, M2).  
 
Table 2 
Regression of monetary base and M2 growth on non-core liability growth 
(Sample period: 2003–09) 
Dependent variable:  
Monetary base growth  
Dependent variable:  
M2 growth 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 

















Short-term interest rate    0.192 
(0.419) 
  0.142 
(0.204) 
Number of countries  14  14  14  14 
Number of observations  1139  1139  1141  1141 
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.223  0.212  0.258  0.250 
Hansen test (p-value)  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Note: The values in parentheses are robust standard errors.    *, **, and *** indicate statistical significances at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Results of panel-VAR model 
In addition to the single equation models estimated above, a VAR model could be considered 
as usual, since one of our main interests is the interactions between non-core liability growth 
and monetary variable growth. However, our dataset consists of panel data on 14 countries 
from 2003 to 2009; we should hence use a panel-VAR methodology instead of a traditional 
VAR model.  
A Panel-VAR model is specified as   where   is the two-variable 
vector comprising non-core liability growth together with monetary base growth or M2 growth 
or the money growth factor,   the individual fixed effect, and   the error term. 
In addition to monetary base and M2 growth, we extract their first principal component, which 
is the common factor in the variations of monetary base and M2 growth. This approach has 
the benefit of controlling the idiosyncratic shocks to each monetary variable. We order the 
variables with non-core liability growth placed first, and then the monetary variable. After the 
individual fixed effects are removed, we estimate the dynamics of the vector as a first order 
VAR, by GMM.  
From the results of the orthogonal impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks, a 
shock to non-core liability growth significantly increases monetary base growth, M2 growth, 56  BIS Papers No 60
 
 
and the money growth factor; this effect peaks after about two or three months and then 
gradually dies off.  
Conclusion and policy implications 
Our findings suggest that under the current interest rate-oriented monetary policy framework, 
which has made monetary policy and macroprudential policy inseparable, the central bank 
needs to take into account the endogeneity of asset prices and credit cycles when 
formulating monetary policy. More importantly, this suggestion applies not only to the 
United States but to a broad range of countries. 
Note that our argument so far has centred around the way of setting the policy rate, and has 
not considered deployment of macroprudential policy tools such as capital requirements and 
buffers, forward-looking loss provisioning, liquidity ratios etc. In particular, we have argued 
that the central bank should set the policy rate, giving consideration to its effects on financial 
procyclicality.
8 Having said this, we also acknowledge that, on some occasions, monetary 
policy in the form of policy rate adjustments may not be sufficient to ward off asset price 
bubbles.
9 And we are open to the possibility that the central bank may additionally need a 
more adequate set of tools, other than the policy rate alone, if it is to sufficiently dampen 
financial procyclicality.
10 
The fact that the current interest rate-oriented monetary policy is designed to accommodate 
credit shocks requires that the central bank build up its ability to identify these shocks in a 
timely manner. Detecting these shocks is not easy in practice and we also acknowledge that 
both type I and type II errors matter – that is, missing an existing credit shock, or falsely 
detecting a credit shock that actually does not exist – since these would lead to inappropriate 
monetary policy. However, this does not necessarily mean that the central bank should 
develop an early warning system or a Taylor-type policy rule augmented with a variable that 
represents the status of financial fragility. We doubt that an early warning system that emits a 
binary signal or a simple rule-based monetary policy can do the job, but suspect rather that 
the central bank needs to closely monitor a wide range of data and variables showing the 
status of financial intermediaries and financial markets. 
Finally, we would like to add that the central bank needs to beware of the possibility that 
communication would become more difficult and credibility would be damaged because the 
central bank might have to set the policy rate at a higher level in order to prevent financial 
                                                  
8  Once a financial crisis occurs, even setting the policy rate at zero would not be sufficient in the current interest 
rate-oriented monetary policy framework. This is because interbank transactions involving MT would stop 
functioning in the crisis. Supplying high-powered money into the overnight or short term money market would 
therefore have little impact on the longer term bond markets. The central bank may need to transact directly 
with financial intermediaries at a wide range of maturities – in Figure 1 on page 5, this implies that the central 
bank intervenes at all of the maturities, points D, A and L – which justifies the major central banks’ responses 
to the recent financial crisis including their broadenings of eligible collateral and counterparties for open 
market operations and providing liquidity through longer-term facilities. 
9  Many authors have pointed out that the policy rate is a blunt and sometimes poor instrument for dealing with 
asset price bubbles and financial stability. See Dale (2009) and Blanchard et al (2010). 
10  It is worthwhile noting that many economists and scholars, Blanchard et al (2010) and the Squam Lake 
Working Group on Financial Regulation (2009) to name but a few, have recently recommended that the 
central bank should be given an explicit mandate for financial stability and should be a macroprudential 




11 Enhancing transparency would in this regard be necessary 
to maintain central bank credibility. 
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